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NOTE

PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE: REDEFINING INFRINGEMENT
LIABILITY FOR DIVIDED PERFORMANCE OF
PATENTED METHODS
I.

INTRODUCTION

We've made so many achievements and come a long way in our
understandingand application of genetics knowledge. And yet, we are
just beginning to realize the full potential of this science to predict the
onset of disease, diagnose earlier,and develop therapies that can treat
or cure Americansfrom so many afflictions .... [W]e stand at this new
and expansive frontier ofpersonalized medicine.., that can protect and
promote our health.
- Barack Obama l

Suppose that there are present in your genetic make-up certain
mutations or variants which increase your susceptibility to a specific
disease.2 If a diagnostic test can be used to detect such variants well
before the manifestation of clinical symptoms, a physician can diagnose
early and employ therapies that may delay or prevent the adverse effects
of disease altogether.3 Further, detecting particular genetic variants
following the onset of symptoms may allow a physician to more
precisely identify your disease,4 and determine the safety and efficacy
of specific pharmaceutical and other therapies, enabling the physician
1. 153 CONG. REc. 7528-29 (2007) (introducing the Genomics and Personalized Medicine
Act of 2007 in the U.S. Senate).
2. See Geoffrey S. Ginsburg & Jeanette J. McCarthy, Personalized Medicine:
Revolutionizing Drug Discovery and Patient Care, 19 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 491, 493 (2001)
("Genetic variants can be used to predict the predisposition of an individual for future disease
development.").
3. See id. ("The ultimate goal of personalized medicine is to define disease at the molecular
level so that preventive resources and therapeutic agents can be directed at the right population of
people while they are still well.").
4. See id. ("[M]olecular diagnosis based on gene- or protein-expression fingerprints might
differentiate diverse diseases with similar clinical phenotypes.").
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to tailor treatment in a manner best adapted to your individual
disease characteristics. 5
Now suppose that you are on the board of directors at a large
clinical laboratory that develops and performs diagnostic testing. You
are aware that conducting research to identify gene variants that will
allow physicians to prescribe treatment in a way that is best adapted to
an individual patient's needs could be a profitable undertaking for your
company. 6 However, such research will involve a substantial investment
of capital, and thus holds considerable financial risk.7 If your company
makes the necessary expenditures to discover these gene variants, and
unauthorized physicians and diagnostic testing companies then use these
discoveries to provide treatment options to their patients without
compensating you, you may be unable to recoup your investment.8 In
light of this concern, you may decide to forego research efforts to make
discoveries of useful genetic markers, unless there exists some

5. See Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to PersonalizedMedicine, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 301, 302 (2010) (discussing how breast tumors that overexpress human
epidermal growth factor receptor type 2 ("HER2"), caused by a mutation in the HER2 gene, despite
indicating a less favorable prognosis, predict better responses in patients to the medication
trastuzumab); S.H. Katsanis et al., A Case Study of PersonalizedMedicine, SCI., Apr. 4, 2008, at 53
(discussing the advantage of using a patient's genotypic variant profile to determine optimal
pharmaceutical dosage over a traditional trial-and-error approach and the ability to predict
interactions of a drug with a patient's other medications based on the presence of certain genetic
markers). Increases in efficacy and safety resulting from diagnostic testing can also result in
substantial cost reductions for healthcare consumers. See Jerel C. Davis et al., The Microeconomics
of PersonalizedMedicine: Today's Challengeand Tomorrow's Promise, 8 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG
DISCOVERY 279, 279 (2009) ("Although such tests cost from US$100-3,000 per test, they save
$600-28,000 per patient."). An example of such a diagnostic test that is commercially available is
Oncotype DX TM , a reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction ("RT-PCR") assay that analyzes
gene expression in twenty-one genes to predict tumor recurrence in breast cancer patients and
allows for stratification of patients based upon the likelihood of benefit from chemotherapy. Melina
B. Flanagan et al., Histopathologic Variables PredictOncotype DXTM Recurrence Score, 21 MOD.
PATHOLOGY 1255, 1255-56 (2008).
6. See Davis et al., supra note 5, at 282 ("Molecular diagnostics are often cited as a more
attractive market segment than typical diagnostics, given the potential for higher prices ... and
higher gross margins .....
7. See id.
8. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 680-85 (2004) (explaining that inventions are merely
information that can be easily appropriated by competitors who do not bear the cost of development
and that "[tihe public good characteristics of information make it more difficult to earn a good
return on an investment in producing new information"). This is known in patent law as the "freerider problem." Id.
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protection against appropriation of your discovery by others, 9 such as the
exclusive rights granted by a patent.' 0
You cannot secure a valid patent over the physical sequence of
DNA for which you have discovered a use, even if it is isolated from the
surrounding genetic and cellular material.'" Further, a diagnostic test to
analyze a patient's DNA for the presence of a molecular variant using
conventional DNA analysis techniques, without more, is not patenteligible.' 2 Still, you are likely to obtain a valid patent when you claim as
your invention a specific application of this genetic information in a
treatment method wherein a patient is tested for certain molecular
markers by way of a diagnostic test, and a physician administers a
prescribed treatment based upon that test.13 But, even supposing that you
have obtained a patent that will withstand a challenge to its validity,
your decision to invest in the discovery of useful genetic markers will
turn more importantly
on your ability to enforce your patent rights
14
against competitors.
A patent grant ostensibly gives an inventor the right to exclude
others from practicing the patented method, exposing unauthorized users
to liability for infringement. ' 5 However, under the "single-entity rule,"' 6
there is no liability for direct infringement unless an individual party or
parties, under an entity's "control or direction," performs each and every

9. See id.
at 682 ("[1]f an inventor who is motivated by profit concludes that free riders will
compete away her chance to cover her invention costs, the inventor will refuse to incur those costs
at the outset. As a result, if we want the benefits offered by capital-intensive inventions and easily
copied inventions, we must provide a fix that banishes the free riders.").
10. See id. at 683 ("We... target the free riders' use with a right to exclude, providing the
inventor with a time-limited right to exclude others from using the invention ....The patent
insulates the inventor from price competition and thus provides the inventor a chance to recoup her
investment.").
11. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116-20
(2013).
12. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012);
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1334-35 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
13. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067-69 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (holding that a claim to a treatment method incorporating information derived from a
diagnostic assay is eligible for patent protection); Holly J. Atkinson et al., PersonalizedMedicine
Patentsat Risk: Tips for Battling Prometheus andMyriad to Obtain Claims to Diagnostics, CIPA J.,
Mar. 2013, at 127.
14. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
7531, at *17 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("A patent that cannot be enforced
on any theory of infringement, is not a statutory patent right."); Miller, supra note 8, at 680-85.
15. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2006).
16. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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step of the claimed method.1 7 Absent evidence of control or direction by
a single party, the patent owner must rely on the "inducement-only"
rule, 8 where infringement liability exists only where one party either
actively induced other parties to perform each and every step of the
method or performed some of the steps of the method itself and actively
19
induced the performance of the remainder of the steps.
Since personalized medicine methods involving diagnostic testing
and treatment administration steps are performed by two parties acting in
concert, that is, a clinical laboratory performing diagnostic testing and a
physician, neither party is performing all of the steps alone.2 ° Further, it
may be that neither the diagnostic testing party nor the physician is
under the "control or direction" of the other party. 21 Thus, while
unauthorized users of patented diagnostic testing and treatment methods
may be practicing each and every step of a claimed method when viewed
in combination, the patent owner will be unable to enforce his exclusive
rights absent evidence of active inducement, which will be difficult to
show in the context of unauthorized use of diagnostic testing and
treatment methods.22 Thus, these inventors are provided with a right to
exclude that rings hollow, and which gives little incentive by way of the
patent system to pursue research into beneficial biomarkers.2 3
Although patent scholars generally agree that incentivizing
innovation is the primary purpose of the patent system, 24 competing
theories, arguing for alternative scopes of patent protection, have been
forwarded describing how the patent system can best effectuate that
aim.25 However, these theories are not actually inconsistent with one
17. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
18. Akamai, 692 F.3dat 1319.
19. Id. at 1305 (majority opinion).
20. See Press Release, Mayo Clinic & SV Bio, Mayo Clinic and SV Bio Enter Strategic
Relationship on Genome Diagnostics and Interpretation (Jan. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Mayo Press
Release], available at http://www.svbio.com/sites/default/files/fields/press-release-pdf/svbiomayofinal.docx .pdf ("SV Bio's turnkey genomics interpretation solutions query a patient's
genome at the point of care and distill the biological data into a concise, actionable report that
physicians can use to make faster, more informed decisions."); Akamai/McKesson DecidedImplicationsfor PersonalizedMedicine Patents, STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & Fox PLLC (Sept.
5, 2012), http://skgf.com/media/pnc/3/media. 1763.pdf [hereinafter Akamai/McKesson Decided].
21. See Mayo Press Release, supra note 20 (announcing an arms-length collaborative
agreement, as opposed to an agency relationship, that would satisfy the control or direction
standard).
22. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306; infra Part III.C.
23. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Today's new rule of
inducement-only liability serves no public interest, no innovation need. The consequences for the
technology communities are uncertainty, disincentive, and new potential for abuse.").
24. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597
(2003).
25.

See id. at 1615-30 (discussing the different levels of protection implicated by prospect
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another, but rather, the theory that best effectuates the utilitarian
purposes of the patent system depends upon the structural realities of the
industry in question.26 Further, Professors Dan L. Burk and Mark A.
Lemley have identified areas of the patent system where courts are left a
considerable amount of discretion to adapt general requirements to
particular circumstances, calling these areas "policy levers., 27 Courts
can use these policy levers to inject industry-specific patent policies that
will allow the patent system to take into account the realities of
innovation in different industries and utilize a theory of protection that
best achieves the utilitarian purposes of the patent system.2 8
This Note argues that, because a broad scope of patent protection is
necessary to offset the high level of commercial risk involved in the
research and development of innovative genetic inventions, 29 the current
standard for divided infringement is insufficient to incentivize
innovation in the personalized medicine industry. 30 Further, this Note
suggests that infringement liability is a previously unrecognized patent
policy lever.3' Finally, this Note proposes that, given the need for greater
protection in the field of personalized medicine, courts should utilize
their discretion under this newly recognized policy lever to implement a
rule providing for the enforcement of diagnostic testing and treatment
methods in cases of divided performance.32
Part II of this Note explains why broad patent protection is needed
to spur the development of personalized medicine by providing an
overview of the personalized medicine industry,33 and outlining theories
of patent protection.34 Part III describes the development of the current
standard for patent infringement in cases involving the divided
performance of patented methods.3 5 Part III then discusses the
implications that the current divided infringement standard has for the

theory, competitive innovation theory, cumulative innovation theory, anticommons theory, and the
theory of patent thickets); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim InterpretationMethodologies and
Their Claim Scope Paradigms,47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 49, 117-24 (2005) (discussing the broad
scope of protection implicated by the prospect theory of patents and the narrow protection
warranted under competitive innovation theory).
26. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1615-30.
27. See id at 1638-68.
28. See id.
at 1675-96.
29. See infra Part H.B.
30. See infra PartlI.C.
31. See infra PartW.B.
32. See infra PartIV.D.
33. See infra PartI.A.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra Part Il.A-B.
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enforceability of personalized medicine methods
and the incentives to
36
innovate in the personalized medicine industry.
Part IV of this Note argues that infringement liability is a policy
lever that gives courts discretion to take into account industry-specific
policy in formulating infringement standards.3 7 Part IV also analyzes
previously proposed divided infringement standards and describes why
they are inadequate to achieve the requisite level of protection in the
personalized medicine context. 38 Part IV then proposes a standard for
courts to use when evaluating infringement of personalized medicine
methods.39 Part V concludes this Note.4 °

II. INCENTIVIZING PERSONALIZED MEDICINE INNOVATIONS
BY WAY OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

Discovering the molecular basis of disease involves difficult and
costly research of genetic material.4 1 Meanwhile, patent eligibility
requirements limit the ways in which inventors can protect the discovery
of beneficial genetic information.4 2 Encouraging investment in the
development of personalized medicine inventions requires construing
these limited patent rights broadly in order to prevent the appropriation
of these discoveries by competitors.43
Subpart A provides an overview of personalized medicine and the
inherent market risks that may deter investment in genetic research. 44
Further, Subpart A discusses the patentability of personalized medicine
discoveries.45 Finally, Subpart B describes theories of patent protection
and how they indicate that broad protection is needed to incentivize the
development of innovative personalized medicine inventions.4 6
A.

PersonalizingMedicine

The core hypothesis of personalized medicine is that "diseases are
heterogeneous, from their causes to rates of progression to their response

36. See infra Part III.C.
37. See infra Part IV.B.
38. See infra Part IV.C.
39. See infra Part IV.D.
40. See infra Part V.
41. See Davis et al., supra note 5, at 282; Ginsburg & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 494-95;
infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Partf.B.
44. See infra Part I.A.
45. See infra Part I.A.
46. See infra Part 1l.B.
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to drugs. ' ' 7 Variations in individual patients occur at the molecular level
in their genetic code, and minor variations explain such characteristics as
height and hair color.4 8 However, more significant variations, often
involved in complex interactions with other genes as well as
environmental factors, define the characteristics of disease, determining
a patient's predisposition to disease, disease prognosis, and safety and
efficacy of treatment.49
Personalized medicine seeks to identify these variations that will
allow physicians to make more accurate diagnoses at an earlier stage, or
even before disease manifests, as well as make more effective treatment
decisions. ° Once identified, a test can be developed to screen patients
for the presence of molecular markers by comparing a patient's DNA to
a normal reference sequence, testing gene products that will indicate
variations in DNA such as proteins or RNA, or using DNA probes which
bind to sequences of DNA containing variants. 5' Diagnostic testing
companies can perform these analyses to detect variants and provide
information on disease characteristics to physicians.52 Then, physicians
may implement targeted preventative or therapeutic treatments best
suited to the needs of individual patients based upon the molecular and
environmental factors that determine the patient's disease progression
and drug response. 3 Further, pharmaceutical companies can utilize
identified molecular markers to develop drugs that are the most effective
for particular groups of patients. 4
However, discovering the molecular mechanism of disease is a
complex endeavor, both because of the complexity of genomic material
and the influence of the interactions between numerous genes and
environmental factors on disease.5 5 While nearly 99.9% of the genetic
code of all humans is identical,56 the remaining DNA consists of
47. See Ginsburg & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 492-93.
48. See Kristen L. Burge, PersonalizedMedicine, Genetic Exceptionalism, and the Rule of
Law: An Analysis of the PrevailingJustificationfor Invalidating BRCA 1/2 Patents in Association
of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 8 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 501, 509 (2013).
49. See Geoffrey S. Ginsburg & Huntington F. Willard, Genomic and PersonalizedMedicine:
FoundationsandApplications, 154 TRANSLATIONAL RES. 277,281-83 (2009).
50. See Ginsburg & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 491.
51. See Burge, supra note 48, at 516-17.
52. See Ginsburg & Willard, supra note 49, at 280 ("[T]o support a clinician in his or her
treatment of a patient with breast cancer, an [Electronic Health Records] system could consider the
gene expression profile of the patient's cancer biopsy and provide an individually tailored prediction
of how the patient is likely to respond to various therapeutic options."); Mayo Press Release, supra
note 20.
53. See Ginsburg & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 493.
54. See Katsanis et al., supranote 5, at 53.
55. See Ginsburg & McCarthy, supranote 2, at 494-95.
56. Eric S. Lander, Scientific Commentary: The Scientific Foundations and Medical and
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millions of individual nucleotides, mutation in any one of which can
result in numerous diseases.57 Further, since many diseases are not
caused by single mutations, but rather by interactions between variations
in a number of genes in addition to environmental factors, identifying
58
precisely such mechanisms of disease is an even greater challenge.
This complexity necessitates large financial investments in research
59
in order to develop diagnostic testing methods and targeted therapies.
The high costs and lengthy time period associated with development
contribute to the significant business risk facing companies considering
molecular diagnostics. 60 Additionally, delays in regulatory approval,
coverage for genetic testing by insurance companies, and adoption of
testing by healthcare providers increase the financial risk.6 1 Add to these
inherent market risks the problem of appropriation of research efforts
by competitors,62 and there exist major economic challenges
and few incentives to invest in beneficial research of molecular
disease markers.63
Innovators in the field of personalized medicine have sought to
protect their substantial investments in research and development by
way of the patent system. 64 However, since molecular diagnostics
involve naturally occurring genetic material and basic biochemical
interactions, subject matter eligibility requirements have posed problems
for securing patent protection.65 One avenue of protection that

Social Prospectsof the Human Genome Project,26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 185 (1998).
57. See Burge, supra note 48, at 509.
58. See Ginsburg & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 494 ("To uncover DNA variants that predict
common, complex diseases that result from a combination of genes and environmental factors will
require cost-effective, high-throughput genotyping; large, well-characterized patient populations;
sophisticated computational methodologies; and a detailed understanding of the biological pathways
of disease.").
59. See Davis et al., supra note 5, at 282.
60. See id.
61. See id (discussing that, based on benchmarks from several molecular diagnostics
businesses, a one-year delay in the adoption of an average diagnostic test can reduce the 10-year net
present value of such a test from $15 million to $10 million).
62. See Miller, supranote 8, at 680-85.
63. See Davis et al., supra note 5, at 279, 282 ("Although scientific challenges remain, it now
seems that the economic challenges.., present the most significant obstacles to the further
development of personalized medicine.").
64. See Burge, supra note 48, at 510.
65. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116-20
(2013) (holding claims to isolated DNA molecules ineligible for patent protection); PerkinElmer,
Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App'x. 65, 68-73 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a diagnostic testing
method involving screening markers in a pregnant woman to determine the risk of Down syndrome
in the fetus is not eligible for protection). The language of the statute governing subject matter
eligibility is broad. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
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companies have sought consists of directing patent claims to the gene
associated with the disease itself, when isolated and purified from the
surrounding material.6 6 However, in Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics,6 7 the Supreme Court determined that these claims are
invalid because they assert ownership over products of nature, subject
matter that is ineligible for protection. 68 Companies have also attempted
to protect genetic discoveries by claiming the diagnostic method used to
identify the presence of a molecular marker in a patient. 69 However, the
Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus 70 made claiming diagnostic tests
generally more difficult when it held that a method claim directed to
merely observing a natural correlation in a patient, without more, is not a
patent-eligible application of a law of nature. 71 This holding was
subsequently applied to invalidate claims to diagnostic tests in which a
patient is tested for the presence of a molecular marker to indicate
disease susceptibility. 2
However, the use of the correlation between a molecular marker
and disease in the making of treatment decisions is a specific application
of a law of nature.73 Thus, personalized medicine inventors can likely

thereof, may obtain a patent therefore .... "); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09
(1980) (discussing that the legislative history of the statute indicated that Congress intended for
subject matter eligibility to be construed broadly). However, judicially created exclusions on
patentability of laws of nature, products of nature, abstract ideas, or the "basic tools of scientific and
technological work" exist because granting protection over such basic elements of scientific inquiry
would "foreclose[] more future innovation than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify."
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
66. See U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995) (claiming an isolated DNA coding for
a BRCA1 polypeptide, associated with the development of breast cancer).
67. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
68. Seeid. at 2117-20.
69. See Burge, supranote 48, at 516-17.
70. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
71. See id. at 1297-98. "[T]o transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible
applicationof such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the
words 'apply it."' Id. at 1294. The Court held that the method for determining optimal therapeutic
dosage of a pharmaceutical involving the steps of "administering" the drug and "determining" the
level of drug metabolites in the patient's blood does not add enough to the non-patentable law of
nature, namely the correlation between drug metabolites and optimal dosage, to make the method
claim valid. Id. at 1297-98.
72. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that claims directed to "comparing" or "analyzing" patients'
DNA sequences are indistinguishable from claims held ineligible for protection in Mayo), rev 'd in
part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013);
PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F.Appx. 65, 68-73 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
73. See Classen Inmunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that the addition of an immunization step to a diagnostic test was a sufficiently "specific,
tangible application" to "traverse[] the coarse eligibility filter of § 101").
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still obtain valid claims, despite recent Supreme Court decisions, where
they add a treatment administration step following the diagnostic testing
step.7 4 These claims may take the form of a two-step process that entails:
"(1) Test[ing] for mutation X and, if present, (2) Administer[ing] drug
y.,,75 Given the manner in which genetic testing is carried out and
treatment decisions are generally made in the healthcare industry, a
diagnostic testing company will perform the testing step and a physician
will perform the administration step. 6 While such patents are valid, their
ability to encourage innovation in the personalized medicine industry
depends upon the scope of protection they provide to their owners when
they need to be enforced. 7 The discussion will now turn to an
examination of the scope of protection needed to encourage innovation
78
generally and in the personalized medicine industry specifically.

74. See id; Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 126; Elizabeth A. Doherty, Biomarker and
Personalized Medicine Patent Claims One Year After Mayo v. Prometheus, FULL DISCLOSURE
(June
http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/Newsletters/FullDisclosure/2013/June/
2013),
FullDisclosureJun13_5.html; see also Angela L. Morrison, Mayo v. Prometheus: PatentEligibility
of Claims Covering NaturalLaws, COLO. LAW., July 2012, at 77, 82-83 (advising that claims should
be "novel," "active," and "specific"). To be novel, claims can "include... a novel relationship
between what is detected and a particular disease, a novel method of administration, or a novel
means of detecting or determining the target." Morrison, supra, at 83. Additionally, a claim may be
active by avoiding mental steps in favor of steps where an actor physically does something. Id.
Finally, a claim may be specific by describing exactly how to detect genetic markers and specific
commercial embodiments. Id.
75. See Akamai/McKesson Decided, supra note 20. Claims involving a therapy
administration step are perhaps not the only claims involving genetic testing that may be patentable
following Myriad and Mayo. See Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 128-29. For example, claims
directed to a diagnostic method using a novel antibody or assay to detect a molecular marker, a
method for detecting a novel or unexpected combination of markers, or a method reciting the use of
a man-made DNA probe to detect a molecular marker may be patent eligible. See id Of these
methods, however, those involving an administration step have Federal Circuit precedent supporting
their patentability. See Classen, 659 F.3d at 1067-69. Additionally, under Myriad, claims directed to
complementary DNA ("cDNA") remain patent eligible because the non-coding regions have been
removed, and it is thus not a naturally occurring molecule. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
76. See Mayo Press Release, supranote 20.
77. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
7531, at *17 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("A patent that cannot be enforced
on any theory of infringement, is not a statutory patent right. It is a cynical, and expensive, delusion
to encourage innovators to develop new interactive procedures, only to find that the courts will not
recognize the patent ....
");Miller, supra note 8, at 680-83 (discussing that an inventor's decision
to invest in innovation will depend upon his ability to exclude competitors and thus insulate himself
from price competition and recoup investment).
78. See infra Part ll.B.
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B. PromotingProgressand Theories of Patent Protection
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant exclusive patent
rights to inventors. 79 The aim of this authority is set out in the
Constitution itself: promoting progress. 80 This express authorization to
hinder competition by vesting an exclusive right in inventors represents
a departure from the Framers' general abhorrence of economic
monopolies, 8' and thus demonstrates their attentiveness to the collective
interest in the creation of technology.8 2 Although theorists have sought
to justify the patent system on grounds of moral right, reward, or
redistributive justice, the central purpose of the patent system is
widely viewed as a utilitarian one, providing the incentive of a
limited monopoly to spur the research and development of socially
beneficial technologies.83
How to best effectuate the primary utilitarian goal of the patent
system is an issue far more contentious than the underlying justification
itself, with scholars in fundamental disagreement as to the level of
protection needed to provide adequate incentives to invent without
preventing innovation that will occur in the usual course of the
competitive market.84 According to prospect theory, 5 patents encourage
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. Congress has the power to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
80. See id.
81. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) ("[Thomas]
Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion to monopolies. It was a monopoly on
tea that sparked the Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equivalent form of
monopoly under the new government.").
82. Stacie L. Greskowiak, Note, Joint Infringement After BMC: The Demise of Process
Patents, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 357 (2010); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS 581, 581 (Joyce Appleby &
Terence Ball eds., 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas Jefferson] ("Considering the exclusive
right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the
difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent, and those which are not.").
83. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1597 (discussing that other justifications for the
patent system "are hard to take seriously as explanations for the actual scope of patent law," and
that agreement amongst courts and commentators as to this basic utilitarian purpose of patent law
occurs "[t]o a greater extent than any other area of intellectual property"); see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson, supra note 82, at 580 ("Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising
from [inventions], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or
complaint from anybody."). But see David S. Olson, Taking the UtilitarianBasis for Patent Law
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 192-97
(2009) (arguing that, absent a determination of whether protection is actually needed to incentivize
innovation in a certain industry, there has been a proliferation of patent monopolies that actually
serve to stifle innovation).
84. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1599 ("The growing body of economic literature on
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future innovation by way of ex post incentives. 86 When a patentee is
granted protection, he is encouraged to invest in further developments
and improvements of the invention that will maximize its value, just as a
landowner is encouraged to develop and improve his land efficiently. 7
By way of licensing agreements, he can control the downstream
development of the invention in an efficient manner that could not be
achieved without exclusive rights, in which case the patentee would fear
"that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information
that competitors can appropriate. 8 8 According to this theory, then,
patents should grant their owners a broad scope of protection early in the
inventive process over not only the specific invention described, but also
all of its commercial embodiments and potential improvements.89
Conversely, under competitive innovation theory, 90 patent
protection is needed only to provide ex ante incentives to innovate. 9 1
Patent protection is important to overcome the "free rider" problem and
enable an inventor to recoup his investment in research and
development, 92 but once an invention is created, competition provides
such incentives ex post that the exclusivity of the patent grant is no
longer necessary to encourage companies to innovate, as they will do so
93
anyway out of a desire to improve their competitive market position.
Thus, under this theory, patents should grant very narrow protection,
giving the patentee a limited monopoly over a manner of competing in
the relevant market, but not complete market control.94
Prospect theory and competitive innovation are two of many
theories that exist to describe how the patent system can best achieve its
primary utilitarian goal. 95 Inasmuch as these theories provide
patent theory has developed at least five distinct approaches to the proper scope and allocation of
patent rights." (emphasis added)).
85. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
265-71 (1977) (describing prospect theory as "reintegrat[ing] the patent institution with the general
theory of property rights").
86. See Cotropia, supra note 25, at 122.
87. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1601.
88. See Cotropia, supra note 25, at 122 (quoting Kitch, supra note 85, at 276).
89. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1615-16 ("[P]rospect theory suggests that patents
should be broad, stand alone, and confer almost total control over subsequent uses of the product.").
90. See id. at 1604.
91. See id. at 1605 ("Prospect theory is wrong, on this view, because the only reason we need
intellectual property rights is to create ex ante incentives, not ex post control rights.").
92. See Miller, supra note 8, at 680-85.
93. See Cotropia, supranote 25, at 118-19.
94. See id.at 119.
95. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1600-07. Other theories Burk and Lemley discuss
are cumulative innovation theory, anticommons theory, and patent thickets theory. Id. at 1607-15.
For other property-based views of intellectual property, see generally Kenneth W. Dam, Some
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justification for alternative scopes of patent protection, they seem
fundamentally inconsistent with one another. 96 However, Burk and
Lemley argue that this is not necessarily the case.97 Rather, they argue
that, "[t]he range of patent theories parallels the range of ways in which
the patent system affects companies in different industries. Like the
proverbial blind men with the elephant, every theorist has focused on
one aspect of the patent system, appropriate for one industry but
irrelevant to others. 98 Thus, under this view, the patent theory that best
predicts the optimal scope of patent protection will vary depending upon
&
the industry context to which it is applied. 99
For example, the prospect theory of patent protection, which favors
a broad scope of patent protection early in the inventive process in order
to allow for control over future innovation by a single firm, could predict
the optimization of innovation incentives in the pharmaceutical
industry.100 The cost to develop new pharmaceuticals is exorbitantly
expensive in itself, and even following development, the drug must go
through a drawn-out and costly approval process.'0 ' Further, competitors
who enter the market later with a similar drug do not bear the burden of
an extensive approval process, 0 2 exacerbating the "free-rider"
problem.10 3 Also, given the nature of chemical compounds, closely
related molecules to those developed by the patentee may achieve the
same physiological result, and thus pharmaceutical inventions face the
risk of being easily designed around by competitors to avoid
infringement. 104 Thus, the scope of the patentee's rights should be
construed broadly so as to cover related chemical products. 105
On the other hand, competitive innovation theory, which supports a
very narrow scope of monopoly power, perhaps most accurately predicts
appropriate innovation incentives in industries having an absence of
large and long-term development costs, such as business methods and

Economic Considerationsin the Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
321 (1995); Trotter Hardy, Property (andCopyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217.
96. Burk & Lemley, supranote 24, at 1615.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id.
at 1615, 1674 ("These differences are so stark that it may not even be meaningfiul
to speak of the 'right rule' in a particular area of patent law without reference to the characteristics
of the industry or innovation in question. Ignoring such differences is counterproductive.").
100. Seeid.at1615-17.
101. Seeid. at 1616.
102. See id.
103. See Miller, supra note 8,at 680-85.
104. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1617.
105. See id.
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Internet software. 10 6 Business methods will arguably be developed
despite a lack of, or only modest, patent protection since they provide0 a7
competitive advantage and involve little or no cost to develop.1
Similarly, the rapid development of the Internet occurred using open
protocols of a nonproprietary nature, supporting the conclusion that there
were existing incentives to innovate without strong, or even any, patent
protection. 0 8 Burk and Lemley urge that "[u]nder these conditions,
patents should be rare and very modest in scope in order to allow market
forces their fullest latitude."' 0 9
The personaalized medicine industry would seem to map most
appropriately onto the prospect theory of patent protection, given its
similarities to the pharmaceutical industry." l0 Like pharmaceuticals,"'
molecular diagnostics are extremely costly to develop," 12 given the
difficulty of research into the complex nature of molecular interactions
that drive the mechanisms of disease. 1 3 Additionally, a lengthy approval
process increases the costs associated with developing molecular
diagnostics," 4 just as in the case of pharmaceuticals," 1 5 and thus,
competitors subsequently providing the same diagnostic test will have
the advantage of avoiding such costs. 116 Further, since the same genetic
information can be obtained by several different methods, and similar
pharmaceutical compounds can achieve identical therapeutic results,
diagnostic testing and treatment administration methods are subject to
being easily designed around. 117 Thus, competitors may benefit from the
discovery, although the investors in the initial research will have
endured the much higher costs of discovering the important genetic
information itself." 8 As a consequence, the personalized medicine
market provides inventors with little incentive to invest in research and
development,' 19 as is true for the pharmaceutical market. 20 The

106. See id.
at 1617-19.
107. See id.at 1618.
108. Seeid.at 1619.
109. Id.
110. See id.
at1615-17; Davis etal.,
supra note 5,at282.
111. See Burk & Lemley,supra note 24, at1616.
112. See Davis etal.,
supra note 5, at 282.
113. See Ginsburg & McCarthy, supra note 2,at494-95.
114. See Davis etal.,
supra note 5, at 282-83.
115. See Burk & Lemley,supra note 24, at1616.
116. See Davis etal.,
supra note 5,at 282.
117. See Burge, supra note 48, at516-17 (discussing different methods of obtaining diagnostic
information from a patient's DNA); supra note 104 and accompanying text.
118. See Davis et al., supra note 5, at 282.
119. Seeid
120. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1615-17.
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similarities that personalized medicine shares with pharmaceuticals
indicate that patent rights in personalized medicine inventions should be
construed broadly so as to give would-be inventors the incentives
necessary to invest in genetic research. 12' The discussion will now turn
to how the scope of protection for personalized medicine methods22 is
determined by the rules governing liability for divided infringement. 1
III.

DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT: THE "SINGLE-ENTITY" AND
"INDUCEMENT-ONLY" RULES

Patent holders can enforce their exclusive rights by bringing an
action for patent infringement against unauthorized users of their
claimed invention. 123 Unauthorized parties that use the invention
themselves are liable for direct infringement, 124 while parties that
actively induce others to directly infringe are liable for indirect
infringement. 25 Since diagnostic testing and treatment methods involve
the interaction between a clinical laboratory and a physician, the
unauthorized use of methods covered by patents may similarly involve
both unauthorized diagnostic testing companies and unauthorized
physicians acting in concert.1 26 Since direct infringement requires the
accused to have performed all of the steps of a claimed method, 127 and 28a
predicate direct infringement is necessary for a finding of inducement,
establishing infringement liability in the field of personalized medicine
is problematic as there
is no single party performing all of the steps of
29
1
method.
claimed
the
121. Seeid. at 1617.
122. See infra Partll.
123. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281 (2006).
124. Seeid. § 271(a).
125. See id.
§ 271(b).
126. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing attempts by Myriad Genetics to enforce its diagnostic testing
claims against other clinical laboratories who were providing the results of diagnostic tests to
physicians), revd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107, 2116-20 (2013); Mayo Press Release, supra note 20.
127. SeeNTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
128. See Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("A defendant's liability for indirect infringement must relate to the identified instances of direct
infringement.").
129. See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (addressing the problem of liability for inducement arising in two consolidated
cases where "the defendant has performed some of the steps of a claimed method and has induced
other parties to commit the remaining steps (as in the Akamai case)," and where "the defendant has
induced other parties to collectively perform all the steps of the claimed method, but no single party
has performed all of the steps itself (as in the McKesson case)"); see also BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("With other parties performing some
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This Part will discuss the rules that have developed in Internet
software and business methods cases governing liability in the divided
performance context, 3 and the implications of these rules for
personalized medicine. 131 Subpart A will discuss the "single-entity rule"
32
that governs direct infringement in cases of divided performance.1
Subpart B will discuss the "inducement-only" rule that governs liability
for indirect infringement in the divided performance context.' 33 Finally,
Subpart C will discuss how these rules affect the enforceability of
patented personalized medicine methods and how the scope of
protection they afford personalized medicine inventors is insufficient to
achieve the utilitarian aim of the patent system in this industry.134
A. Direct Infringement Liabilityfor
DividedPerformanceof Method Claims
As provided by 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), 3 5 "whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
36
during the term of the patent therefor" is liable for direct infringement.
The first step for courts in an action for infringement is to construe the
claims of the patent in order to determine the limitations of the owner's
proprietary interest. 137 The purpose of the claims, which are required to
"particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention," 138 is to notify the public,
including potential competitors, of the precise scope of the patentee's
right to exclude. 139 The claims are construed according to the meaning
they would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art, in light of the
description of specific embodiments of the invention in the remainder of
claimed method steps, this court must determine if Paymentech may nonetheless be liable for direct
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).").
130. See infra Part I.A-B.
131. See infra Part III.C.
132. See infra Part III.A.
133. See infra Part HI.B.
134. See infra Part II.C.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
136. Id.; see Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (discussing that § 27 1(a) governs direct infringement).
137. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
139. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Manitowoc Co., 448 F. Supp. 1372, 1386 (E.D.
Wis. 1978), aff d, 603 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1979) ("The purpose for [claims] is to 'distinguish what is
claimed from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future
enterprise."' (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942))).
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the patent document, and the 4history
of the patent's prosecution in the
0
Patent and Trademark Office.
Following claim construction, courts compare the claim so
construed to the allegedly infringing use.14 1 Direct infringement is a
strict liability offense, 142 and thus, the lack of intent to infringe or a lack
of knowledge of the patent on the part of the accused is irrelevant to a
determination of liability. 143 Likewise, independent creation, that is, a
claim by the defendant that it did not copy, but rather, independently
44
developed the invention, is not a defense to patent infringement.1
However, under the well-settled "all limitations" rule, there is no
infringing "use" within the meaning of the Patent Act unless each and
every limitation of the claim has been practiced. 145 For a method claim,
this means that each and every step of the claim must be performed in
the manner set forth. 14 6 Thus, while it is clear that a single party
140. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
141. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 149 F.3d at 1315.
142. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
143. See id.("[T]he nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced
damages are warranted.").
144. See Chris Falkowski, Protecting Software: The Case for Software Patents, MICH. B.J.,
June 2007, at 24, 27 (discussing that, while trade secret cases will often involve a claim that the
defendant independently thought of the invention, which is a valid affirmative defense, this defense
cannot be raised in the patent context). Several commentators have argued that the law should
provide for an independent creation affirmative defense to patent infringement. See generally
Michelle Armond, Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions for
PreliminaryInjunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. REv. 117 (2003) (arguing for
an affirmative defense of independent creation to a motion for a preliminary injunction in order to
avoid abuse of preliminary injunctions); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to
Patent Infringement, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 268 (2008). The lack of a defense for
independent creation is a divergence from other areas of intellectual property. See Falkowski, supra,
at 27 (discussing how copyright or trade secret protection for software may be frustrated by
independent creation by competitors). At least one commentator has discussed the perplexity of the
availability of the independent creation defense for copyright infringement, but not patent
infringement, given that "[t]rue independent creation of any but the simplest of artistic works, with
perhaps the exception of popular music, is statistically highly unlikely," while conversely, "nearly
identical or overlapping inventions are frequently developed, often contemporaneously, in patent
law." Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REv. 465, 526 (2004).
145. Herman Miller, Inc. v. Teknion Corp., 504 F. Supp. 2d 360, 365 (N.D. 111.2007); see
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) ("Each element contained
in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a
whole."); Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. 336, 341 (1842) (holding that in a patent that is a combination
of three elements, "[t]he use of any two of these parts only, or of two combined with a third, which
is substantially different ...is... not the thing patented" and that "[c]onsequently the use of either
alone, by the defendants, would not... infringe the patent of the plaintiffs"). For the purposes of
this Note, "Patent Act" refers to all patent provisions contained in Title 35 of the U.S. Code.
146. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("A method
or process consists of one or more operative steps, and, accordingly, '[i]t is well established that a
patent for a method or process is not infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are
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performing all of the steps of a claimed method is liable for direct
infringement, "when the acts necessary to give rise to liability for
direct infringement are shared between two or more actors, doctrinal
problems arise.' 47
The Federal Circuit addressed divided performance in 2007 in BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P. 148 The patent holder BMC
Resources, Inc. ("BMC") claimed a method for processing payment
transactions over a telecommunications line using the payee's account
number or debit card number.14 9 The payee would be prompted to enter
his number using a telephone keypad, and then a remote financial
network would be accessed to determine whether sufficient funds were
available and either approve or deny the transaction. 150 The alleged
infringement of Paymentech, L.P. ("Paymentech") consisted of the
receipt of the payee's payment information from a merchant, the routing
of said information to a debit network that then forwarded it
to an affiliated financial institution for authorization or denial
of the transaction, and the informing of the merchant of the status of
the transaction.' 51
Since the debit network, the financial institution, and the merchant
each performed some of the steps of the claimed method, Paymentech
did not perform the entire claimed method itself.' 52 Nonetheless, BMC
argued that under Federal Circuit precedent, a party could be liable for
direct infringement, even though it did not perform all of the steps of the
claimed method, if infringement resulted from the "participation and
combined action(s) of more than one person or entity.' ' 153 However, the
utilized."' (quoting Roberts Dairy Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976))).
Furthermore, all of the steps of the claimed method must have been practiced in the United States.
Id.
147. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc).
148. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
149. Id. at 1375-77.
150. Id. at 1376-77.
151. Id. at 1375-77.
152. Id. at 1375.
153. Id. at 1379-80 (quoting On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In On Demand, the claimed invention was a method for selling a single copy
of a book, wherein a party took an order from a customer for a copy of a book and then printed and
bound a single copy for sale to the customer. On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1335-36. The alleged
infringer took orders for a single book copy from customers, but another party did the printing and
binding. Id. at 1335. The Federal Circuit stated on appeal that it "discern[ed] no flaw ... as a
statement of law" in the district court's jury instruction that "[w]hen infringement results from the
participation and combined action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers
and jointly liable for patent infringement." Id. at 1344-45. However, an issue of claim construction
governed the outcome of the case and the court's statement with regard to joint infringement was
not essential to its holding. Id. at 1334.
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court declined to endorse this rule as the proper standard for joint
infringement, instead holding that a defendant who performed fewer
than all of the steps of a claimed method may only be liable for direct
infringement if the parties performing the remaining steps were under
the defendant's "control or direction."'' 54 Since BMC had not proffered
sufficient evidence to show that Paymentech had controlled or
directed the other155parties, Paymentech could not be liable for
direct infringement.
The court was convinced that the "single-entity rule"'156 "derives
from the statute itself," requiring that a party practice the entire
invention to be liable for infringement.1 57 Thus, except where the
conduct of the other parties can be attributed to a single infringer, the
statute requires a finding of non-infringement. 158 Though the court
acknowledged that the "control or direction" standard could be easily
subverted by two parties entering into an arms-length agreement, 159 it
nonetheless determined that expanding direct infringement to cover
actions by entirely independent entities would "subvert the statutory
scheme for indirect infringement," reasoning that a patent owner would
likely never need to bring an action for indirect infringement if direct
Further, the
infringement covered conduct by independent parties.
court believed that the problem of divided performance through arms-

154. BMC Res. Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380-81. In a subsequent case, the court determined that the
"control or direction" standard is satisfied "where the law would traditionally hold the accused
direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party that are required to
complete performance of a claimed method," that is, where the accused would be liable for the acts
of the other party under common law principles of agency. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
155. BMCRes., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381-82.
156. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting).
157. BMCRes.,Inc.,498F.3dat 1380.
158. See id.
159. Id.at 1381.
160. Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255,
262 (2005). Lemley and his coauthors note:
Construing the patent laws to permit the individual, non-infringing acts of unrelated
parties together to add up to infringement would render both § 271(b) and § 271(c)
meaningless. Section 271(b) provides that a party is liable if it knowingly induces
another to infringe. But on a theory of joint infringement, no one need ever sue for
inducement. All they need allege is that a party performed one of many steps of a
method, and that someone else performed another step. No intent would be required.
Lemley et al., supra. But see McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7531, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (involving the owner of a method patent
relying on the theory of inducement against a software provider, where the software provider
performed none of the steps of the claimed method itself, but rather healthcare providers and
patients acting in concert performed the entire method).
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length agreements reflected poor claim drafting on the part of the patent
owner, and that the patentee should bear the burden of drafting claims
during the application stage to capture performance by a single party. 161
A further justification for the "single-entity rule" is that a broader
standard would entangle innocent parties. 162 Since direct infringement is
a strict liability offense, a broader rule would make parties that neither
performed all of the necessary acts to constitute infringement, nor had
any way of being aware that others were performing the remaining steps,
liable for infringement. 163 Under this view, "[b]ecause virtually all
modem patents are combinations of existing elements, permitting
enforcement of distributed patent claims against anyone who produces
or performs any single element, with or without an intent to infringe,
would sweep a large number of innocent actors within the ambit of
patent infringement."' 64 Indeed, in some circumstances, a broader direct
infringement standard could open up parties to liability "who contributed
only staple items of commerce---computers, telecommunications
networks, routers, and the like," or innocent consumers that performed
only one step in a claimed method where, for example, some proprietary
software performs the remainder of the steps. 65 Because a remedy for
direct infringement is unavailable to patent owners in the case of divided

161. See BMCRes., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381 ("A patentee can usually structure a claim to capture
infringement by a single party ....[T]his court will not unilaterally restructure the claim or the
standards for joint infringement to remedy these ill-conceived claims."). In this case, the court was
convinced that BMC could have drafted its claims to reach infringement by a single party, rather
than multiple distinct entities. Id. ("The steps of the claim might have featured references to a single
party's supplying or receiving each element of the claimed process."). Many patentees, of course,
had already obtained patents prior to BMC that were subject to divided performance. See Ken
Hobday, Comment, The Incredibly Ever-Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement: Multi-Actor
Method Claims, 38 CAP. U. L. REv. 137, 150-51, 163-67, 186 (2009) ("[M]any important and
perhaps seminal patents filed during the early days of e-commerce in the 1990s may as a practical
matter be unenforceable."). A patentee could perhaps remedy such deficiencies after patent issuance
by way of a reissue application to amend claims to capture infringement by a single actor. See 35
U.S.C. § 251 (2006). But see Damon Gupta, Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking
Protection Under the Single Entity Rule, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 61, 68-69 (2012)
("Presumably, there are many patents, largely for internet based applications, that include a divided
claim ....Considering how overtaxed the USPTO is presently, having as many afflicted patents
come back for reissues would be excruciatingly overwhelming.").
162. See Lemley et al., supra note 160, at 282-83; see also Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane).
163. SeeAkamai, 692 F.3d at 1307.
164. Lemley et al., supranote 160, at 282.
165. Id.; see also Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(involving an online auction process where a consumer served as a bidder and performed one of the
steps of the claimed method).
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performance, patent owners may attempt to rely on an66inducement
theory in order to reach unauthorized divided performance. 1
B. Liabilityfor Inducing DividedPerformanceof Method Claims
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b),'167 "[w]hoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."' 168 Inducement
liability extends to a party who "cause[s], urge[s], encourage[s], or
aid[s]" direct infringement by another party and the induced conduct is
actually carried out. 169 Unlike liability for direct infringement,
inducement liability requires an inquiry into the mental culpability of the
accused. 70 Although the statute does not expressly require specific
intent,1 71 courts have reasoned that implicit in the language that the
infringement be "actively" induced is the requirement that the accused
not only knowingly induce the acts that constitute infringement, but also
know that the induced acts constitute infringement of an existing
patent. 172 Finally, since "[t]here is no such thing as attempted patent
infringement,"' 173 the alleged inducing party cannot be held liable for
encouraging or causing the commission of acts by another74party that
ultimately do not constitute direct infringement of the patent.
After deciding the direct infringement issue, the BMC court
addressed liability for inducing infringement in the context of divided

166. See infra Part ll.B.
167. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
168. Id.
169. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (quoting Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms., PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1379 n.13 (Fed. Cir.
2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See Andrew Ward, Inducing Infringement: Specific Intent and Damages Calculation, 94
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 1, 3 (2012) (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d
660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
171. See35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
172. See DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Water
Techs. Corp., 850 F.2d at 668).
173. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308.
174. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972) ("[1]t is
established that there can be no contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a direct
infringement. 'In a word, if there is no [direct] infringement of a patent there can be no contributory
infringer.' (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting on other grounds))); Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263,
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Indirect infringement, whether inducement to infringe or contributory
infringement, can only arise in the presence of direct infringement, though the direct infringer is
typically someone other than the defendant accused of indirect infringement."); Met-Coil Sys. Corp.
v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no
inducement liability because there was no direct infringement where the supposed direct infringer
practiced the invention, but had an implied license to do so).
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performance. 175 The court relied upon the general rule for indirect
infringement that there can be no liability for inducing infringement or
contributory infringement in the absence of a direct infringer, 176 and held
that Paymentech was not liable for inducing infringement of BMC's
claimed method because there was no party liable for direct infringement
under the "control or direction" standard. 77 Thus, following BMC,
where independent parties divided performance of a claimed method,
and there was no "single-entity" performing the claimed method,78 a
patentee had no remedy for either inducement or direct infringement. 1
In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, 179 the court
recognized that this rule left patent owners with no remedy where parties
intentionally divide performance of a claimed method for the purpose of
circumventing the owner's rights. 80 However, the court declined 181
to
infringement.
direct
concerning
BMC
from
holding
the
disturb
Instead, the court overruled BMC regarding inducement, holding
that a party could be liable for inducing infringement even absent
the performance
of all of the steps of the claimed method by a
82
1
entity.
single
The court reasoned that "[r]equiring proof that there has been direct
infringement as a predicate for induced infringement is not the same as
requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a direct

175. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
176. See id.; Dynacore Holdings Corp., 363 F.3d at 1272.
177. BMCRes.,Inc.,498F.3dat 1381.
178. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306 (discussing that recent decisions of the Federal Circuit
"have interpreted section 271(b) to mean that unless the accused infringer directs or controls the
actions of the party or parties that are performing the claimed steps, the patentee has no remedy,
even though the patentee's rights are plainly being violated by the actors' joint conduct").
179. 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
180. See id at 1306.
181. Id.at 1307 ("Because the reasoning of our decision today is not predicated on the doctrine
of direct infringement, we have no occasion at this time to revisit any of those principles regarding
the law of divided infringement as it applies to liability for direct infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(a)."). As Judge Pauline Newman notes in dissent, the only issue for which en banc
review in Akamai was granted was to rule on the issue of direct infringement, and thus the "singleentity rule," in the divided infringement context. Id.at 1321 (Newman, J., dissenting). More than
three-dozen organizations, representing a wide array of technological industries, including
biotechnology organizations, social media companies, and financial services companies, filed briefs
as amici curiae on the issue of direct infringement, but the issue was ultimately not addressed. Id.at
1303-05 (majority opinion); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial
Consequences of Akamai, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 499, 507 (2012) ("Although most observers
believed the court would address the 'single entity' rule of direct infringement, and then necessarily
the law of inducement given its contingency on direct infringement, the court did no such
thing ....
Instead, the court's decision was specific to active inducement under § 271(b).").
182. SeeAkamai, 692 F.3d at 1306.
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infringer." 183 Because § 271(a) uses the term "whoever," it requires a
person to perform the acts necessary to constitute infringement in order
to be liable for direct infringement. 8 4 Section 271(b), on the other hand,
contains no limiting language requiring the performance of the
underlying infringement by a single party.' 85
The patent claims involved in the two consolidated cases on appeal
in Akamai were directed to a method for electronic communication
between patients and healthcare providers and a method for efficient
delivery of web content. 186 The accused infringer of the electronic
communication method, Epic Systems Corp. ("Epic"), licensed a
software program that facilitated communication between healthcare
providers and patients. 187 The accused infringer of the web content
delivery method, Limelight Networks Inc. ("Limelight"), performed
some of the steps of the method and provided instructions to customers
for performing the remaining steps. 188 The court held that Epic could be
liable for inducing infringement if the lower court found on remand that
Epic's software induced healthcare providers and patients to collectively
perform the claimed method. 189 Further, the court held that Limelight
could be liable for inducement if the lower court determined that it
performed all but one of the steps of the claimed method itself and
induced the performance of the remaining step by its customers.' 90
Thus, this "inducement-only" rule' 91 provides patent owners with a
remedy against parties who intentionally divide performance of claimed
methods for the purpose of avoiding infringement. 92 Further, it avoids
subjecting innocent parties that perform fewer than all of the steps of the
claimed method to liability because they will lack the requisite intent. 193
However, whatever benefit the extra protection of the "inducement183. Id. at 1308-09.
184. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309.
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309. The Court found further support for
this rule in the legislative history of the Patent Act, see Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309-11, accomplice
liability in criminal law, see id. at 1311-12, and liability for inducing tortious acts, see id at 131213. As one commentator notes, since § 271(b) does not contain the territorial limitation requiring
that the infringement occur within the United States that is found in § 27 1(a), divorcing inducement
liability under § 271(b) from the conditions of direct infringement in § 271(a) could result in
findings of inducement liability for infringement occurring wholly outside of the United States by
an inducing party located outside of the United States. See Holbrook, supra note 181, at 508-12.
186. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Seeid.at 1318-19.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 1326 (Newman, J., dissenting).
192. See id.at 1309 (majority opinion).
193. See id.at 1308 n.1.
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only" rule provides to the industries involved in Akamai, diagnostic
testing and treatment methods in the personalized medicine industry may
94
remain unenforceable despite this extra layer of protection.'
C. Implications of the DividedInfringement Standardfor
PersonalizedMedicine
For personalized medicine methods that contain an administration
step in addition to a diagnostic testing step, 195 the "single-entity" rule
requires that either the physician or diagnostic testing company,
performing some of the steps of a claimed method, control or direct the
performance of the remainder of the steps by the other party in order for
direct infringement liability to arise.' 96 However, the relationship
between diagnostic testing companies and physicians may be in the
nature of an arms-length agreement or collaboration, rather than the
principal-agent type of relationship required to satisfy the control
or direction standard. 97 Thus, where unauthorized physicians and
diagnostic testing companies divide performance of a patented method,
98
neither party is likely to be liable for direct infringement.'
As a consequence, the owners of personalized medicine method
claims must rely upon a theory of inducement in order to enforce their
exclusive patent rights. 99 This requires that the patentee meet the burden
of proving that the unauthorized physician or diagnostic testing company
performing some of the steps of the claimed method had knowledge of
the patent and encouraged the performance of the remaining steps by the
other party. 200 However, concerning the physicians, it is unlikely that
they will be aware of the existing patent that covers the method.20 '
Further, even where a patent owner can establish that a physician had the
requisite knowledge of the patent, the remedies available against
physicians are limited by statute.20 2 Concerning diagnostic testing
companies, while it may be easier to prove knowledge of the patent at
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
196. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Doherty, supra note 74 ("[l]t might be difficult to ultimately prove infringement of such a claim
given that a single actor may not perform both the patient treatment and the diagnostic assay
steps.").
197. See Mayo Press Release, supra note 20.
198. See Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 129; Doherty, supra note 74.
199. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc).
200.
201.

See id.; Akamai/McKesson Decided,supra note 20.
See Akamai/McKesson Decided,supra note 20.

202.

See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006).
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issue, it is unlikely that patent owners will be able to prove that the
diagnostic testing company encouraged the physician to administer a
treatment based upon the results of the diagnostic test that the company
provided. 20 3 Thus, the divided infringement standard articulated
by the Federal Circuit potentially allows competitors to utilize
claimed personalized medicine methods while escaping liability
for infringement.2 °4
As discussed above, companies are unlikely to invest in the
development of useful diagnostic testing and treatment administration
methods when the patent system does not provide strong patent rights,
given the absence of incentives to innovate provided by the market.20 5
Personalized medicine inventors are currently not provided strong patent
rights due to a divided infringement standard that requires patent owners
to prove knowledge of the patent in issue absent a single infringer and
allows competitors to use claimed methods without facing liability. 0 6
Further, strict subject matter eligibility requirements have rendered
many personalized medicine claims invalid. 0 7 The patent system is thus
unlikely to achieve its utilitarian aim in the personalized medicine
industry, since broad protection is needed to encourage investment in
these research intensive technologies.20 8 However, by viewing
infringement liability as an area where Congress has granted courts
discretion to implement industry-specific patent policy, courts may limit
the holdings of the previous divided infringement cases to the types of
industries there involved, and fashion a new, broader
rule for divided
20 9
context.
medicine
personalized
the
in
infringement

203. See Mayo Press Release, supra note 20 (discussing that the role of the clinical laboratory
is to provide genetic information to physicians who can thereafter use that information to benefit
patients); Akamai/McKesson Decided,supra note 20.
204. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part H.A.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 195-204.
207. See supra Part H.A.
208. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
209. See infra Part IV.
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USING A POLICY LEVER TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEABILITY OF
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE METHOD PATENTS

The court should simply acknowledge that a broad, all-purpose
single-entity requirement is flawed.
- Judge Pauline Newman, United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuie'
The cases in which the divided infringement standard was
developed involved different technologies and different policy concerns
than those involved in the personalized medicine industry. 21' Namely, a
greater scope of protection is needed to encourage the development of
personalized medicine methods than is necessary for the types of
inventions involved in BMC or Akamai.21 2 This Part argues that
Congress has given courts the discretion to take these differences in
policy into account to develop industry-specific rules for
infringement. 213 Further, courts should use this discretion to fashion an
infringement rule for diagnostic testing and treatment methods that
provides for liability in cases where one party provides the results of the
diagnostic testing step to a physician, who thereafter uses those results in
the performance of the administration step.21 4
Subpart A discusses "policy levers," areas of the patent system
where Congress has delegated the authority to courts to formulate
industry-specific patent rules.21 5 Subpart B argues that infringement
liability is a policy lever that gives courts discretion to formulate
industry-specific infringement standards and discusses the relevant
policy differences in the personalized medicine context that warrant a
broader infringement standard.21 6 Subpart C considers previously
proposed tests for divided infringement liability that could be applied to
personalized medicine inventions, and concludes that these tests would
be insufficient to provide the broad scope of protection needed to
encourage the creation of personalized medicine methods.2 17 Finally,
210. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 253-76.
212. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306 (majority opinion) (involving Internet software); BMC
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (involving a payment method);
supra Part H.B (discussing the difference between the protection needed for, on one hand, Internet
software and business methods, and, on the other hand, personalized medicine).
213. See infra Part V.B.
214. See infra Part 1.D.
215. See infra Part [V.A.
216. See infta Part I.B.
217. See infra Part I.C.
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Subpart D discusses how infringement liability in cases of divided
performance of diagnostic testing and treatment methods should be
determined to provide the necessary scope of protection in the
personalized medicine industry.21 8
A.

PatentPolicy Levers

Since the optimal scope of patent protection varies in light of
relevant differences in the way innovation occurs in particular
industries,219 it follows that these differences should be taken into
account when formulating the rules of the patent system. 220 Congress
could perform this function itself when enacting patent legislation.2 21
However, this would create a number of difficulties,222 and as Professors
Burk and Lemley argue, Congress has chosen instead to delegate
the
2 23
authority to formulate industry-specific patent rules to the courts.
The Patent Act, according to Burk and Lemley, exists, as all
statutes do, "on a continuum between detailed rules such as the tax code
capable of rote application on one end, and rules like antitrust law
delegating broad authority to judges to make correct decisions on the
other., 224 With general, industry-neutral standards concerning patent
validity and scope that must be applied in idiosyncratic technological
industries, the patent system falls on this continuum somewhere near the
broad judicial authority present in antitrust law.225 Judges hearing patent
cases are thus given wide discretion to consider industry-specific policy
in applying general patent rules, making these areas of discretion
"doctrinal policy levers" that can be used by judges to adjust the scope
of protection in order to achieve the utilitarian purpose of patent law in
the industry at issue.226

218. See infra Part IV.D.
219. See supra Part H.B.
220. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1630-3 1.
221. Seeid.
222. Id.at 1634. Among the primary issues with relying upon industry-specific patent
legislation is that such a route "would involve substantial administrative costs and uncertainties" as
Congress attempted to draft statutes tailored to the vast number of technical categories into which
inventions could fit. Id.at 1635-47. Even should Congress be able to meet the burden of such a task,
it would still leave the issue of accommodating new technology that was not, and could not, be
considered when the statutes were adopted. See id.
223. See id. at 1638.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.at 1638-40.
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Burk and Lemley identify a number of existing policy levers.22 7 The
prohibition on protection for abstract ideas, the utility requirement, and
the disclosure requirement are just a few.228 Courts use the prohibition
on patenting of abstract ideas, which is ostensibly a restriction on subject
matter eligibility, to deny patent protection for entire concepts, which
could stifle downstream innovation in some industries.229 Similarly,
courts apply a heightened utility requirement in the field of life sciences,
requiring that a claimed product have an identified or "specific" use in
order to prevent the preclusion of research on the product that could
result in further innovation downstream. 230 The disclosure requirements,
both enablement and the written description requirement, are policy
levers similarly applied in the chemical and pharmaceutical context to
limit protection, so as231to not deter research that could result in
downstream innovation.

However, Burk and Lemley argue of this latter example that, given
the manner in which prospect theory maps these industries,23 2 the
disclosure requirements, properly used as policy levers, would be
relaxed so as to give patentees the broad scope of protection necessary to
allow them to overcome the high research and development costs that
are associated with such innovation.23 3 In other instances, courts have
replaced their discretion in adjusting these policy levers with rigid rules
that largely confine their discretion.234 If courts endeavor to set the legal
rules in these areas without considering industry-specific policy, they are
nonetheless setting patent policy, but they are doing so inadvertently
rather than intelligibly.2 35 A benefit of recognizing these policy levers,
227. Id. at 1641-68 (identifying a number of areas of judicial discretion fit for treatment as
policy levers in addition to those described here, such as experimental use, secondary considerations

for nonobviousness, reasonable interchangeability, pioneering patents, reverse doctrine of
equivalents, presumption of validity, new secondary considerations, patent misuse, and injunctions);
see also Cotropia, supra note 25, at 127-33 (arguing that claim interpretation methodology is a
patent policy lever).
228. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1642-5 1.
229. See id. at 1642-44.
230. See id. at 1644-46.
231. See id. at 1648-54.
232. See id. at 1615-17.
233. See id.at 1686-87.
234. See id. at 1672-73.
235. See id. at 1674. Whether or not courts openly acknowledge and discuss their policy

determinations, their decisions in areas that can be identified as policy levers will necessarily
require them to make substantive rules, since there is indeed no clear statutory guidance on these
issues. See Cotropia, supra note 25, at 129-30 ("No statutes exist that dictate how claims are

interpreted, and claim interpretation methodologies include claim scope paradigms that embed
patent theory in the resulting claim definitions. When courts are faced with choices between
methodologies, they are also facing patent policy choices."). Thus, the objection that Congress is
better equipped to consider policy concerns is misplaced, since Congress has failed to provide
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then, and considering industry-specific policy explicitly, is that the
setting of these rules becomes transparent as courts and observers can
clearly discern the policies that inform decisions made in the context
of particular industries.2 36 The discussion will now turn to the
discretion that courts are given to develop industry-specific rules
governing patent infringement.23 7
B. Infringement Liability as a Policy Lever
Despite Chief Judge Randall Rader's announcement in BMC that
the "single-entity" rule "derives from the statute itself,, 238 the language
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) does not compel a reading that all of the steps of a
claimed method must be performed by a single party in order for direct
infringement liability to arise. 239 First, while it is settled that
infringement liability requires performance of each and every element of
the claimed invention, 240 the use of "whoever" in the statute24 does not
require that all elements be performed by a single party. 242 The rules of
statutory construction laid out in 1 U.S.C. § 1 provide that, "unless the
context indicates otherwise ... words importing the singular include and
apply to several persons, parties, or things., 243 Further, the term
"whoever" appears elsewhere in the Patent Act, such as in the provision
governing who may obtain patent protection. 244 This use of "whoever"
cannot be construed to mean that a single inventor must create the entire
invention in order for it to qualify for protection, as evidenced by the
provision providing for joint inventors, and there is no reason to believe
"whoever" should have a different interpretation in § 271(a). 245 As the
guidance, while courts are required to formulate substantive rules. See id. In addition, such
determinations are appropriately delegated to the Federal Circuit, given its "institutional
competence" in regard to patents, which is a result of both its handling of nearly all patent cases
filed in the United States and the technical and patent law backgrounds of some of its members. See
id. at 131.
236. See Cotropia, supra note 25, at 130.
237. See infra Part V.B.
238. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
239. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Infringement is not a question of how many people it
takes to perform a patented method.").
240. See supranote 145 and accompanying text.
241. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
242. SeeAkamai, 692 F.3d at 1322.
243. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1322 ("By statutory canon the word 'whoever'
embraces the singular and plural.").
244. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
245. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006); Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1322.
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Supreme Court has emphasized, "Congress did not use technical or
occult phrases in defining the extent of the rights and privileges secured
to a patentee. 246
Further, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) provides that a patent grants its
owner the right to exclude "others" from practicing his claimed
invention. 247 The Supreme Court has determined that "[i]nfringement is
defined by § 271(a) in terms that follow those of § 154. ,248 Thus, since
the exclusive rights of a patent owner granted under § 154 are violated
by "any person who participates in any wrongful appropriation of the
invention," which could include a party that participates in divided
performance of method claims, by any "method by which the invention
can be made available for the benefit of the infringer,"
such person may
2 49
(a).
1
27
§
under
infringement
patent
for
be liable
If the statute indeed does not require that every step be performed
by a single defendant in order for liability to arise, then it is within the
discretion of courts to establish a standard by which a party can perform
fewer than all of the steps of a claimed method and still be liable for
infringement. 250 This broad discretion will necessarily require courts to
make substantive determinations when adapting the general
requirements of infringement to the particular circumstances involved in
the wide array of industries that make use of the patent system. 25 1 Courts
should thus explicitly consider relevant differences amongst industries to
develop industry-specific rules concerning 25infringement,
using
2
infringement liability as a "doctrinal policy lever.,
A proper exercise of courts' discretion to utilize infringement
liability as a policy lever would include considering the relative measure
of incentives to innovate and other relevant differences in the various

246. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
247. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
248. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518, 522 (1972)); see also H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) ("Section 271, paragraph (a), is a
declaration of what constitutes infringement ....
It is not actually necessary because the granting
clause [35 U.S.C. § 154] creates certain exclusive rights and infringement would be any violation of
those rights."); Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO.
WASH. L. REV.521, 537 (1953) ("Paragraph (a) defines direct infringement and is present only for
the sake of completeness. We got along without it for 162 years and we could again. Its omission
would change nothing.").
249. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1323-24 (quoting WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 897 (1890)); see also id. at 1306 (noting that in the case of divided
performance "the patentee's rights are plainly being violated by the actors' joint conduct").
250. See supra text accompanying notes 224-26.
251. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
252. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1640-41.
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industries in which the problem of divided infringement arises.253
Akamai and BMC-two cases in which the current divided infringement
standard was developed-involved industries where incentives to
innovate exist even in the absence of protection provided by the patent
system, such as business methods and Internet software.254 With low
research and development costs, these industries do not require strong
patent rights in order for innovation to occur.255 In fact, strong patent
protection in these industries may inhibit the competitive market forces
that would spur innovation in the absence of exclusive rights.256 Further,
the concern that truly innocent parties performing only some of the steps
of a patented method would be swept up in liability for infringement
may be valid in these industries, especially in cases where the party
performing the final step is a consumer.2 Thus, construing the patent
right narrowly in Akamai and BMC-by requiring the patent owner to
show either an agency relationship between the parties or active
inducement-may have been appropriate for the industries involved in
those cases.258
However, the policy concerns that warrant a narrow rule for
infringement liability in the Internet software and business methods
industries are not present in the personalized medicine context. 259 First
of all, unlike Internet software and business methods, the market for
personalized medicine inventions lacks sufficient incentives to invest in
innovation absent strong protection from the patent system.260 Rather,
the manner in which innovation occurs in the personalized medicine
industry favors the broad scope of protection that is consistent with the
prospect theory of patents.261
Aside from the greater relative need for protection in the
personalized medicine industry, the concern that a broad divided

253. Seeid.atl641.
254. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306 (involving a patent that covers a method for delivering web
content); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (involving
patent protection for a method for processing a payment transaction); supra text accompanying
notes 106-09. As pointed out above, Internet technology developed in a widely nonproprietary
setting with no ownership rights, and thus incentives could be said to exist absent patent protection,
which would call for a narrow scope of patent rights. See supranotes 106-09.
255. See supra notes 106-09.
256. See Burk & Lemley, supranote 24, at 1619.
257. See, e.g., Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 32 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Lemley et al., supra note 160, at 282-83.
258. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306; BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381-82; Burk & Lemley,
supranote 24, at 1619.
259. See infra text accompanying notes 260-76.
260. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
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infringement rule will entangle innocent parties in infringement liability
does not apply to personalized medicine methods.26 2 Claims to Internet
software or business methods may involve steps performed by
unassuming merchants processing their customers' transactions,263
consumers performing only the final step in an Internet-based method,26
or patients and healthcare providers using a proprietary software
program.265 Conversely, the personalized medicine methods discussed
here only involve clinical laboratories and physicians, rather than
innocent consumers or even parties "who contributed only staple items
of commerce., 266 Diagnostic testing companies-even performing fewer
than all of the steps of the claim--can hardly be considered innocent
parties in the same sense as the customers involved in Internet software
and business methods, as they are likely the competitors of the
inventor.26 7 To the extent that the physicians performing the
administration step are innocent parties, the Patent Act limits the
remedies against them for infringement.26 8
Further, the concern that finding liability in cases of divided
performance would "subvert the statutory scheme for indirect
infringement"-which the court in BMC used to justify the "singleentity" requirement 269-- does not apply in the personalized medicine
context, since there may be at least one situation involving personalized
medicine methods where a party could perform none of the steps of a
claimed method and yet still be liable for inducing infringement. 270 For
example, suppose a pharmaceutical company were to market a drug with
instructions on how to perform a diagnostic test for determining the
262. See infra text accompanying notes 263-68.
263. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375-76, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
264. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1323, 1328-30 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
265. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
7531, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011).
266. Lemley et al., supranote 160, at 282; see supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
267. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1297-98
(2012) (involving a dispute over a diagnostic test between two competing diagnostic testing
companies); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing enforcement actions taken by the owner of a diagnostic testing
patent to prevent unauthorized use by other clinical laboratories).
268. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006).
269. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
270. See infra text accompanying notes 271-72. The extent to which this is even a relevant
concern weighing against a broader divided infringement rule in the software context is
questionable, as shown by the facts of the McKesson case. See Akamai Techs. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane). In that case, the alleged inducer
performed none of the steps of the claimed method itself, and thus the patentee would not have been
able to reach the defendant under any theory of direct infringement, having to rely instead on a
claim of inducement. See id.
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presence of a particular molecular marker, and then described the
administration of a certain drug dosage based upon the presence of that
marker.2 7' In this situation, the pharmaceutical company could be liable
for inducement without having performed any of the claimed method
itself if a physician and diagnostic testing company did in fact follow the
instructions and perform the patented method.272
Finally, the sentiment expressed by the BMC court-that the burden
should fall on patentees since they can address the issue of divided
infringement at the claim drafting stage by writing claims to capture
infringement by a single party--does not allow owners of diagnostic
testing and treatment methods to protect their inventions.273 A valid
claim could probably be drafted to make the conduct of the physician
alone infringing by adding a step wherein the physician requests the
results of a diagnostic test from a diagnostic testing company.2 74 Again,
however, since the Patent Act limits the remedies available against
physicians, 275 requiring patent owners to enforce their exclusive rights
against physicians rather than diagnostic testing companies, who are
likely to be their competitors, is inadequate in view of the broad
protection needed to encourage the development of personalized
medicine inventions.276
Thus, while the "single-entity" and "inducement-only" rules may
properly balance competing policy concerns in the Internet software and
business methods context, 277 the same policy concerns weighing against
protection are not present in the personalized medicine industry.278 In
fact, good patent policy weighs in favor of granting greater protection to
personalized medicine inventions than that provided by the current
divided infringement standard.27 9 What the court has done, instead of
exercising its discretion to implement these industry-specific policy
concerns, is to "confine" a policy lever, creating a strict rule applicable
271. See Akamai/McKesson Decided, supra note 20.
272. See id.
273. See BMCRes., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381; infra text accompanying notes 274-76.
274. See Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 129 ("A method for treating X in a patient
comprising: requesting a test providing the results of an analysis to determine whether the patient
expresses protein A and administering treatment Y to the patient if the patient expresses A.").
275. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006).
276. See supratext accompanying notes 110-21.
277. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (adding protection for inducement in divided infringement of web content delivery
technology, but not doing so in consideration of specific characteristics of the industry in question);
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying the
"single-entity rule" to divided infringement of payment processing technology).
278. See supratext accompanying notes 259-76.
279. See supratext accompanying notes 259-76.
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to all industries, "in effect cabining its own discretion., 280 Courts facing
the issue of divided infringement in the personalized medicine context
should limit the "single-entity" and "inducement-only" rules to
Internet software and business methods and utilize their discretion to
develop an infringement standard that takes into account the relevant
differences in the personalized medicine industry that weigh in favor of
broad protection.28'
C. Previously ProposedTestsfor DividedInfringement
Commentators have proposed a number of divided infringement
tests since the Federal Circuit took up the issue in BMC.282 While not
proposed in an industry-specific manner, to the extent they allow for
greater protection than the current standard, they could be appropriate
for courts to utilize when confronted with divided performance of
personalized medicine inventions.2 83 These proposed standards involve
expansion of the "control or direction" definition itself, by way of a
multi-pronged test, 284 or by applying a standard lower than common law
agency; 281 using principles of civil conspiracy to reach divided
infringers; 286 applying a willful blindness test to cases of divided

280. Burk & Lemley, supranote 24, at 1673.
281. See infra PartlV.C-D.
282. See, e.g., Keith Jaasma, Finding the PatentInfringement "Mastermind": The "Control or
Direction" Standardfor "Joint" Infringement, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
411, 453-56 (2010); Joshua P. Larsen, Liabilityfor Divided Performance of Process Claims After
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 63-64
(2008); Alice Juwon Ahn, Note, Finding Vicarious Liability in U.S. Patent Law: The "Control or
Direction" Standardfor Joint Infringement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149, 174 (2009); Reza
Dokhanchy, Note, CooperativeInfringement: I Get By (Infringement Laws) with a Little Helpfrom
My Friends, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 159-60 (2011); Long Truong, Note, After BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.: ConspiratorialInfringement as a Means of Holding Joint
Infringers Liable, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1897, 1924-26 (2009).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 259-77.
284. Jaasma, supra note 282, at 453. Under this approach, whether a defendant is liable as a
direct infringer in a divided infringement case depends upon the following two factors: "Does the
defendant's alleged 'control or direction' relate to the specific technology accused of infringement?
If so, did the defendant require the third party to perform the relevant limitations of the claim in the
manner provided for in those limitations?" Id.
285. Dokhanchy, supra note 282, at 159-60 (arguing that cooperation, rather than agency,
should be sufficient to find joint infringement); Aim, supra note 282, at 172-74 (arguing that courts
should borrow from the copyright test for vicarious liability and determine whether the defendant:
(1) taught or instructed the other party or parties, and (2) derived a commercial benefit).
286. Truong, supra note 282, at 1924-25. Liability under this proposal would require: (1) an
association of multiple parties; (2) the intent to circumvent the method claim; (3) an agreement to
circumvent the claim and the means of carrying it out; and (4) the actual performance by all of the
parties of the claimed method. Id.
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performance; 87 holding intentional divided infringers liable
under a "prima facie tort" theory; 288 or utilizing a "combined
nuisance" theory.2 89
All of these proposed tests vary to the extent in which the
relationship between divided infringers or the intent of the various
infringers to violate the patentee's rights is relevant, and thus they vary
also in the burden placed on the patentee to prove infringement. 29' Tests
that rely upon theories of civil conspiracy, willful blindness, prima facie
tort, or combined nuisance, by requiring an inquiry into the intent of the
party, protect patent owners from deliberate divided performance for the
purpose of circumventing the method patent. 291 However, this is already
achieved by the current "inducement-only" rule,292 and these tests would
provide inadequate protection to personalized medicine inventors by
placing on them the burden of proving a specific intent to infringe on the
part of diagnostic testing companies. 293
Two of the proposed tests that expand the "control or direction"
standard similarly miss the mark of adequate protection in the
personalized medicine context.294 First, requiring the owner of a
personalized medicine patent to show that a diagnostic testing company
required a physician to perform the administration step in the manner set
287. Gupta, supra note 161, at 71 (arguing for direct infringement liability where a defendant
"subjectively believe[s] that there is a high probability that the collaborative action will constitute
unauthorized practice of a patented process" and "take[s] deliberate actions to collaborate," which
must be shown by evidence that the defendant: (1) "agreed to a collaboration," and (2) "knew the
collaboration would result in unauthorized practice of the patented process"). This willful blindness
test is adapted from that used by the Supreme Court to determine inducement liability. Id. at 70; see
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060,2070-71 (2011).
288. Larsen, supra note 282, at 63-64. Under the "prima facie tort" theory, an intentional
infliction of harm may be actionable, even though the actions taken are in themselves lawful. Id. In
the patent context, a similar theory could justify liability for parties who intentionally divide up
performance of a claimed method. See id. at 64.
289. Id. at 68-70. Similarly to combined nuisance in property-where "a single defendant's
conduct alone would not have interfered with the plaintiffs property," but "the combined effect of
multiple defendants' actions harmed the plaintiff and gave rise to joint liability against each
defendant who possessed knowledge of the other defendant's conduct"-divided infringers "who
knowingly participate in a scheme to appropriate the commercial benefit of a patented process"
could be liable for infringement. Id.
290. See Gupta, supra note 161, at 71 (requiring both an agreement between parties as well as
knowledge of infringement); Dokhanchy, supra note 282, at 159-60 (requiring that some
connection, as opposed to an agency relationship, is sufficient for divided infringement liability);
Truong, supra note 282, at 1924-25 (requiring an agreement between parties in addition to intent to
violate patent rights).
291. See Gupta, supra note 161, at 71; Larsen, supra note 282, at 63-66, 68-70; Truong, supra
note 282, at 1924-25.
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. See supra Part III.C.
294. See infra text accompanying notes 295-98.
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forth in the claim 295 is likely inadequate because there may be no
contract between the two parties requiring the physician to administrate
any particular treatment.2 96 Second, requiring that the diagnostic testing
company teach or instruct the physician on how to perform the therapy
administration 297 could allow companies to avoid liability if they
provide diagnostic test results but do not instruct the physician to use
the particular treatment administration step provided for in the
claimed method.298
The previously proposed test that probably comes closest to
providing sufficiently broad protection to personalized methods would
find liability where there is merely "some connection" between the
diagnostic company and the physician, who have both performed the
claimed method in concert. 299 This standard seems to require less of a
connection than either the "control or direction" standard as currently
envisioned or the other expanded versions previously proposed. °°
However, to the extent the connection is sufficient to give rise to liability
under this standard remains undefined, courts may differ in the types of
connections deemed sufficient in the personalized medicine context, and
a more specific rule for diagnostic testing and treatment methods should
be provided to guide courts' determination of infringement. 30 '
D. A New DividedInfringement Standardfor PersonalizedMedicine
Courts should implement a broad infringement rule- for cases
involving divided performance of diagnostic testing and treatment
methods that will provide personalized medicine inventors with the
appropriate level of protection.30 2 Since the current standard for divided
infringement and most of the standards proposed by academics provide
relatively narrow protection to personalized medicine inventors,30 3 they
are unlikely to encourage innovation in the personalized medicine
295. See Jaasma, supra note 282, at 443-45, 453.
296. See Ginsburg & Willard, supra note 49, at 280 (discussing electronic systems that could
provide a patient's genetic information and dosing recommendations or predictions on how a patient
is likely to respond to certain therapies, but does not direct the physician to choose a particular one);
Mayo Press Release, supra note 20 (discussing that the clinical laboratory will provide a report to
physicians but no requirement that physicians follow any particular course of action or instructions
on any course of action to take based upon such a report).
297. See Ahn, supra note 282, at 167-68.
298. See supra note 296.
299. See Dokhanchy, supra note 282, at 159-63.
300. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Ahn,
supra note 282, at 172-74; Jaasma, supra note 282, at 453.
301. See infra Part IV.D.
302. See supra Part IV.B.
303. See supra Parts I.C, I.C.
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industry by any appreciable measure. 304 As urged above, courts have the
discretion to employ a different rule in the personalized medicine
context, as they are given wide latitude to take into account industryspecific policy concerns when deciding cases of infringement.30 5
Liability for direct infringement of diagnostic testing and treatment
administration methods should arise where a party provides the results
from the diagnostic testing step of a claimed method to a physician who
thereafter performs the treatment administration step based upon the
results of the test. 30 6 The patent owner would thus be relieved of the
burden of proving that the diagnostic testing company had knowledge of
the patent.30 7 Further, the patent owner would no longer need to show
that the company encouraged the physician to perform the treatment
administration step.30 8
The relationship between the physician and diagnostic testing
company need not be examined under this standard except insofar as the
court must be satisfied that the company provided test results to the
physician who actually administered the requisite treatment. 30 9 This
standard thus provides a clearer definition of the connection between the
parties that is sufficient to give rise to liability than the "some
connection" standard previously proposed.3 10 In this situation, the
requirement of such a minimum connection between the two parties

304. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part V.B.
306. Cf Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The court should ... restore infringement to its status as
occurring when all of the claimed steps are performed, whether by a single entity or more than one
entity, whether by direction or control, or jointly, or in collaboration or interaction.").
307. Akamai/McKesson Decided, supra note 20 ("[M]ost physicians will not have the requisite
knowledge of the patents involved to establish an intent to induce."); see supra note 306 and
accompanying text. Compare Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1301 (majority opinion) (holding that, where
independent parties divide performance of a claimed method, one party must induce infringement in
order for liability to arise), and DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (discussing that, for inducement liability to arise, an accused party must have knowledge of
the patent at issue), with In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting
that direct infringement is a strict liability offense).
308. See Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308 (holding that a party who has performed fewer than all of
the steps of the claimed method must have encouraged performance of the remaining steps by
another party in order to be liable for inducement); Akamai/McKesson Decided, supra note 20
(discussing that liability of clinical laboratories under the standard in Akamai is unlikely in this
context, since patent owners will probably not be able to meet the burden of showing that the
laboratory encouraged the physician to administer any particular treatment). But see supranote 306
and accompanying text.
309. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding
that the relationship necessary to give rise to liability requires one party to be under the control or
direction of the other party). But see supra note 306 and accompanying text.
310. Dokhanchy, supranote 282, at 159-63. But see supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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relieves the patent owner of the burden of proving that the physician was
under the control or direction of the diagnostic testing company.3 ' This
would allow patentees to enforce their exclusive rights in the claimed
method against diagnostic testing companies in the types of relationships
that exist between companies and physicians in the personalized
medicine industry.3 12
Courts should explicitly adopt this standard in future cases
involving diagnostic testing and treatment methods, recognizing the
industry-specific policy concerns that inform their decisions, so as to set
policy intelligibly rather than inadvertently, and provide transparency in
their establishment of legal rules.3 13 Such a broad rule would give
personalized medicine inventors a greater scope of protection in an
industry where there may otherwise be few incentives to innovate .3 14 It
is, of course, a prohibitively difficult task to determine the precise scope
of the protection necessary to incentivize innovation in a given industry
without hampering the innovation that would occur in the absence of
patent rights. 31 5 However, a rule that provides personalized medicine
inventors with a clearly enforceable right to exclude competitors from
misappropriating their discoveries is more appropriately aligned with the
needs of the industry and may do much to encourage the growth of an
industry that promises to revolutionize healthcare.31 6
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note posits that courts should adopt a broad standard for
infringement liability in cases involving divided performance of
personalized medicine methods, allowing for liability where a company
provides the genetic information derived from a diagnostic test to a
physician who thereafter uses that information in administering
treatment. 31 7 Strong patent rights are necessary to encourage the
development of personalized medicine because of the large expenditure
of capital necessary for the development of genetic inventions.3 8
However, the current standard governing liability for divided

311. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
312. Compare supraPart M.C, with supra notes 306-11.
313. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1674; Cotropia, supra note 25, at 130; supra text
accompanying notes 306-12.
314. See supra Part I.A-B; see also text accompanying notes 306-08.
315. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1596-615 (discussing the proliferation of theories
of optimal patent scope).
316. See supra notes 110-21, 306-12 and accompanying text.
317. See discussion supraPart IV.D.
318. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
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infringement, requiring a "single-entity" to perform the entire invention
or evidence of active inducement, prevents the owners of personalized
medicine methods from enforcing their exclusive patent rights against
unauthorized users.3 19
The cases in which the current standard for divided infringement
developed involved claims directed to Internet software and business
methods. 320 These industries do not suffer from such an absence of
incentives to innovate as is evident in the personalized medicine
industry, which requires broad protection to incentivize investment in
genetic research. 32' Further, concerns of imparting liability upon
innocent parties and subverting the statutory scheme for indirect
infringement liability-that weighed in favor of a narrow infringement
rule for Internet software and business methods--do not apply to the
personalized medicine industry.322 Meanwhile, the patent system gives
courts discretion to consider industry-specific patent policy when
deciding cases of infringement.32 3 Accordingly, courts should take into
account the relevant differences in the personalized medicine industry
when deciding cases involving divided performance of diagnostic testing
and treatment methods, and should adopt a standard for infringement
that places liability on diagnostic testing companies that participate in
the performance of the method, regardless of "control or direction" or
active inducement of physicians.324
ErikP. Harmon*

319. See discussion supraPart IlI.C.
320. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
discussion supra Part ILA-B.
321. See discussion supraPart ll.B.
322. See discussion supraPart IV.B.
323. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
324. See discussion supra Part IV.
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